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I.
Introduction
Women's land use rights (including control over the production derived) in 
SSA are not uniform, simple, static, nor in general equitable. Attempting 
to deal with the last aspect without studying the former ones has not, in 
general, done much either for equality or for the state of knowledge of 
these interacting structures, processes, relationships, trade offs and 
problems.
One striking feature of the evolution of land use rights in most SSA areas 
and societies over the past two centuries is that with rare exceptions 
modernisation and marketisation have weakened the position of women. This 
record should give pause to advocates of free market measures - e.g. 
unrestricted, single named proprietor, freehold tenure - as self 
implementing means to empowering women. Whether they are relevant to 
transgender issues - e.g. security, investment, productivity - in the ways 
advocates assume is dubious, indeed empirically the nul hypothesis seems to 
hold. Further if the perception of the status quo (or rather evolving 
statum movandum) continues to be that of European colonial and Eurocentric
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2modernisation traditions, results of how action taken through these prisms 
usually impact on African societies, households and persons suggest that 
women are more likely to be marginalised or excluded than assisted or 
empowered.
II.
African Traditional Land Tenure(s)
African traditional land tenure is more commented upon and decried rather 
than studied or understood. A capsule sketch is difficult, not so much 
because in its original forms SSA tenure systems were rarely codified on 
paper, but because African land tenure systems are not identical among or 
between cultural and political groups, are complex and are evolving (and 
present tense) not static (nor past tense).
However, a number of factors are common to almost all tenure systems 
especially for the period before a substantial portion of output was 
produced specifically for sale - a period with different cut off dates in 
different places and, indeed, still pertaining in a few.
First, all aspects of ownership or overall tenure were communal or 
household not individual. The hierarchy tended to be state, political sub­
division, clan or lineage, extended family, household. By no means all 
systems had all five levels nor were the powers exercised at different 
levels uniform. The top three were more analogous to sovereign land rights 
(including reserve areas for future 'wholesale' allocation) than to 
personal ownership or use rights. (A chief's farms were normally perfectly 
distinguishable from those lands he held in trust and in most cases 
allocated on behalf of his people.)
Second, use of land was dominantly household, occasionally extended family 
and almost never communal in the general sense, at least so far as arable 
land was concerned. Even grazing rights were allocated to/held by 
distinct, identifiable groups of households who also had rights over 
adjacent water points where water rather than pasture was the scarce 
resource. The 'tragedy of the commons' (unlimited access to common land 
leading to overuse and pasture degradation) is normally either the result 
of breakdown of traditional allocation systems (not least by forcing them
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'experts' who 'knew' the answers before they looked at the realities on the 
ground or among the relationships.
In respect to arable land use allocation was normally to a household with 
its male head (by social definition for this purpose) holding the use right 
for the household. This did not mean his spouse(s) and certain other 
female relatives did not have land use rights but that it was his duty to 
meet those rights by sub-allocation out of the total household use rights. 
Instances of family land for extended multi household use exist(ed) but 
usually had more to do with inheritance and/or allocation-reallocation than 
use.
Third, the household use rights were secure and usually hereditable. So 
long as land was used the household had a right to keep it which overrode 
debt obligations (though not treason and its agnates). Usually the rights 
to land in use and homes or other improvements on it went to the
appropriate heir on the death of the owner of those rights. Who this was
varied widely but was perfectly determinate in any particular system. 
Children usually and widows virtually universally were not the heirs. This 
was universally the case for children in matrilineal systems who tended to 
inherit from maternal uncles but - especially in the case of extended 
family lands - was also common in patrilineal ones. A widow did have
access to land use rights, but via a male relative (who might or might not
be the heir) most frequently her late husband's brother.
Fourth, the impression that land use rights were frequently reallocated by 
chiefs for fees and were therefore insecure is misleading. Traditional 
sub-Saharan African cropping systems were usually based on long rotation 
(also describable as shifting cultivation but only caricaturised as "slash 
and burn"). Land was cleared and the felled trees/bushes burnt (which 
increased fertility). It was then tilled with no inputs for 3 to 5 years 
and after that allowed to lie fallow (returning to bush and trees) for up 
to 20-25 years before again being cleared and tilled.
Clearly this did mean that use rights to individual bits of land were 
impermanent because land was not in permanent use. But a user household 
had a right to a flow of 'new' specific use rights as it relinquished old. 
Chiefs (who often acted in council) were bound to observe these rights and
4their fees (which were on occasion abused) were for managing the 
community's land/land allocation analogous to court, land register and 
conveyancers' fees.
Fifth, households could rarely transfer use rights. That power rested with 
larger (higher order) bodies. Within the community any member household 
could secure land use rights and the size of use rights areas were usually 
adjusted to household size as a part of the new allocation process when 
moving to new land. Thus the lack of transfer rights related primarily to 
outsiders (would be incomers) and in that case political considerations 
were crucial. While not much studied, it appears temporary user shifts 
among close relatives (e.g. among brothers when one went to war over a key 
crop period) were allowed because not seen as being transfers.
Sixth, attitudes to would be incomers ("strangers") who sought land use 
rights were varied but fairly pragmatic. If a political unit had ample 
land, the incomer credibly offered his allegiance and there were no evident 
cultural differences likely to lead to clashes, strangers could usually - 
on the payment of some fee and the performance of some allegiance - secure 
land use rights. If not, not. This aspect of traditional tenure (like the 
absence of household power to transfer user rights) worked rather well 
because there were few individual household migrants. Remnants of broken 
political groupings were perhaps not infrequent, but their acceptance or 
rejection was a straightforward (even if rarely simple or easy) exercise in 
real politik.
Urban land tenure - in the cases in which cities other than agricultural 
villages were significant - was analogous to arable land tenure. Use 
rights were allocated to households and were normally secure and 
hereditable. They tended to be of longer duration since towns were 
somewhat less liable to rotation than cropped lands. Apart from their 
quantitative smallness they are less significant to present concerns 
because present urban African land tenure is virtually entirely based on 
European principles introduced during the colonial period whereas perhaps 
80 per cent of rural SSA land is owned/allocated/used within norms and 
systems which derive basically from traditional, indigenous practice.
This sketch is not presented to suggest that traditional SSA land tenure 
was perfect in principles, faultless in practice or (even if the foregoing 
had been true) fully suitable to the present. Substantial inequality
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and in its results and was by no means always then seen as equitable (nor 
would it be now). SSA political units were by no means free of abuse of 
power, which the combination of the state and ruler's budgets rather 
facilitated.
The long rotation system depended for its viability on a low household to 
total arable land ratio. The absence of powers to transfer use rights 
raised few questions in the absence both of land shortages and of 
substantial production specifically for sale. The fairly ready, ad hoc 
procedures for strangers really required that there not be very many.
As to the legal aspects these too were not so different from other legal 
systems as is commonly supposed. Elders were not, perhaps, professionals 
but the status did require a working knowledge of past practice - both 
stare decisis and rationale - not just calendar years. Most units, 
households, heirs were quite determinable within the system but vexed 
issues of fact (who really was the appropriate kin? was a claimant the 
person he purported to be?) were not thereby eliminated. Doubtless 
Jarndyce vs Jarndyce had its African parallels well before Dickens!
Women's Rights Within Traditional Tenure Systems
Women's rights to access to land were within household rights. In that 
sense they did not differ from men's. However, in practice the male head 
of household controlled intrahousehold allocation so that wife (wives) and 
dependent adult females (mother, aunts, unmarried sisters, widows, divorced 
women) were dependent on him. His allocation practice was supposed to be 
within norms and customs which entitled each adult woman in the household 
to enough land to grow food for herself and those she was socially 
obligated to feed. How fully (and even-handedly among adult females) these 
norms were followed and how effective social pressure was in sanctioning/ 
correcting departures from them varied widely.
In most SSA polities/societies at this period (and up to the 1970's/80's in 
numerous cases with some remaining today) a female headed household was, by 
definition, impossible. There have always been exceptions to this role 
e.g. the Amhara people and, to a lesser/more complex degree, in much of 
coastal West Africa for at least two centuries. This is sometimes
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Africa that does seem to be a fair reading (and one West or East Africans 
often make!). But it is, at best, an incomplete one.
First, women did have rights/claims. Because no woman with living 
relatives was not a member of a male headed household, no woman lacked a 
male guardian whose duty it was to see that she (and her children) had 
access to land (and certain labour support) to grow food and were not 
allowed to become destitute. Exactly who the relevant man was varied for 
unmarried adult women (a relatively small group), widows and divorced women 
and among societies (especially but not only depending on whether they were 
matrilineal or patrilineal). In any particular society the person was 
determinable.
Second, personal and gender social roles conferring status on women were 
not limited to wifeship and motherhood. The fulfillment of the gender 
specific obligation to feed (by growing, exchanging, preparing) certainly 
was status conferring. More broadly women had gender specific roles in 
religion (especially pertaining to crops), in medicine (including para­
psychology which is not best understood by lumping its multiple, complex 
facets as 'witchcraft'); and in the state (e.g. "Queen Mothership" which 
frequently was a post with significant influence and conditional powers and 
was not uniformly held by a Chief's mother). Historically the particular 
forms of European and Islamic penetration of and ascendancy over African 
polities and societies eroded all of these traditional status roles of 
women which may go far to explain why many African spokeswomen are very 
sceptical of Europeans (especially, but not only, of European men!) 
presenting themselves as the heralds of female empowerment and liberation 
in Africa - historically they usually have been the precise opposite.
Third, certain customary law requirements - whatever their subsequent 
perversion or their appearance in European eyes - did provide protection to 
women. One was dowry - with rare exceptions paid by the groom to the 
bride's family. This was not originally seen as 'selling' a woman. Its 
shift toward being viewed as a recompense for the cost of nurturing and 
educating is relatively recent (which explains its defence by not 
inconsiderable proportions of rural women). It is true that an element of 
exchange of labour power for other sources of income (usually cattle) did 
exist but this was one of three strands. Another was the groom's having
7proved his ability to produce, provide and protect by the work of 
accumulating the dowry (a practice recorded in the Old Testament along with 
that of younger brother's literally marrying their deceased elder brother's 
wife/wives with the duty to 'raise' children to perpetuate their names 
which is still in residual, if retreating, existence in Africa as it was in 
18th Century England). Perhaps most important, dowry provided a protection 
for the wife. If she was mistreated and fled home or divorced without very 
clear and sufficient cause her family kept the dowry which was a severe
loss to the man who would need to accumulate another before he could
remarry. (No protection against wife battering would appear to be 
tyrannical patriarch proof but two to five years income forfeiture with the
power to exact it in the hands of the woman's relatives may be at least as
effective as modern European/North American legal safeguards!)
Land rights within the household in "traditional" SSA societies (indeed in 
most present ones) were not free standing but part of a broader network of 
rights and duties. The and is crucial, most SSA approaches to human rights 
see rights and duties as inextricably linked in both directions and 
assertions of rights without relatively clear statements of consequential 
duties as both unsound and ultimately unenforceable. (Again hardly a 
uniquely African position vide Locke and Mill or for that matter Confucius 
and the Ramayana.)
A women's right to access to land to till linked directly to her duty to 
feed identifiable children and men (as well as herself) which might or 
might not be limited to her own children and husband. It therefore 
subsumed the right to use her own produce to feed directly or via trade 
(barter or sale). Both on the income (kind or cash or barter) and the 
provision (basically food, water, fuel and upkeep - though not usually 
construction - of shelter) sides women had separate, largely gender 
specific budgets. Access to land and control over produce were central to 
the income generation needed to meet the expenditure.
In addition gender specific intra-household labour time budgets existed 
with certain rights/duties for transfers between (among) them. Not all 
food for household use was to be provided by women (meat and fish were 
usually exceptions) nor were most work tasks totally (as opposed to 
dominantly) gender specific. The exchange does not appear to have been 
very equal - male inputs into soil preparation and to a lesser extent
8planting and harvesting of women's crops, even allowing for initial 
clearing seem to have been much smaller than planting, tilling, harvesting, 
preserving time inputs by women into men's crops. Further in respect to 
household work the only male duties tended to be in respect to 
housebuilding (and occasionally spring protection or pond/well building) 
with actual maintenance-operation-provision of water, cleaning, cooking, 
fuelling, housing resting literally on women's backs or heads. But the 
labour exchanges were exchanges within customary norms not unilateral, open 
ended exactions.
As with the land tenure systems, this sketch of women's rights (and duties) 
in relation to them is not designed to assert that a 'golden age' of equal 
rights of full empowerment without gender bias ever existed. Still less 
would it be plausible to suggest that norms were never abused, debased 
and/or violated. Rather it is to outline the nature of the intra-household 
social contracts which did exist both in principle and usually in praxis.
Two Variants
Two special cases (in the sense of mutation from the basic agro based 
pattern) require noting. The first is pastoralism (or pastoral dominated 
agro-pastoralism). Large stock (basically cattle and camels) have almost 
always fallen in male specific duties (protecting/herding) and rights 
(ownership/control over use of proceeds). Small stock (sheep/goats) have 
tended to be divided similarly to crops (production for household use on 
the women's and for sale on the man's side) and poultry (prior to medium 
scale urban market oriented production) largely in the women's domain.
Dairy products and fish appear not to be uniformly divided by gender - 
there are fisherwomen and also dairymen. But the net result is usually 
that in a large pastoral stock dominated economy women's position in the 
household is weaker because men provide much of the food (directly as meat, 
blood and sometimes milk/curd and by exchange for root and grain crops or 
plantains) .
A second special case arises in societies with Islamic cultural elements 
going back several hundred years. In principle Islam recognises female 
property rights within marriage and female inheritance rights rather more 
securely than traditional SSA society laws and norms (or for that matter 
than most Christian traditions). In practice there is little evidence that 
the elements and forms adopted in SSA had any such result, on balance
9probably au contraire. In parts of the Sahel (notably but not only 
Senegal) Muslim order land tenure concentrated control (including the right 
to exact substantial rents) in the hands of the leaders of the orders in a 
form rather more closely resembling the parody of the land grabbing, rent 
extracting chief than any normal purely SSA system known to the author. 
(Some Zulu king/emperors came close but on a much more random and less 
economically oriented model.) However, this system is as readily 
criticiseable on Islamic principles as on any other and was built up 
through a symbiotic/mutual benefit alliance of the leaders of the Orders 
with the French colonial power (symbiotic between them, parasitic as viewed 
by those peasants not convinced that the overlordship was Allah's will).
III.
Evolution Of Traditional Tenure Systems
SSA tenure systems have proven to be both resilient and flexible. Most SSA 
land rights are - in practice - still held under them. Most systems have 
evolved to meet changing contexts and requirements.
The proportion of land basically still under the indigenous systems, the 
nature of change and the interactions (including parallelism, tolerance, 
mutual reinforcement and clashes) with 'modern' code law systems varies 
widely partly in relation to the nature of colonial and successor 
independent governments, partly in response to differing economic and 
ecological contexts and partly along societal lines. These changes and the 
present position are often obscured by most writing (especially by lawyers) 
focussing on the smaller code law sector (usually long term leasehold or 
freehold) and/or by apparent generalisation of codified systems hiding a 
rather different underlying reality.
It is true that substantial areas have been excised from the "traditional" 
land use right systems. At one extreme state land allocable only by the 
central government is significant especially in respect to forests, to 
nature and wildlife reserves and to mineral rights. At the other long term 
leasehold and freehold tenure by corporate bodies and individuals has come 
to exist in all SSA states and to be significant in many. It is dominant, 
however, in respect to land area only in respect to urban land and in the
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southern cone of ex-settler colonies (Namibia, Zimbabwe, fleetingly 
Swaziland and South Africa). Even in the countries in which it dominates 
output and hectarage the proprietors and employees (plus their households) 
are usually less numerous than the households dependent at least in part on 
land use under some form of evolved (or in these cases often manipulated) 
traditional use right tenure.
Forces For Change
Four interacting driving forces for change have been common. Traditional 
land tenure law might have evolved without them - albeit law (including 
oral and traditional) is usually conservative and glacial in pace of change 
if no issues beyond its existing procedures and precedents arise. However, 
the evolution would neither have been as rapid nor along the particular 
lines it has actually taken. In respect to each force opportunities have 
opened up as well as constraints tightened or problems arisen.
First, the opportunities for and perceived need to market significant 
shares of agricultural output have expanded. Certainly the traditional 
systems did have a trade component in order to meet needs or amenity 
targets not produceable by the household but, beyond local barter, these 
were not large proportions of production or consumption. Fairly limited 
specialised production for medium or long distance trade in Africa (e.g. 
shea nuts in West Africa, tobacco in East Africa) "before the Europeans 
came" in some cases grew dramatically as to export (e.g. cocoa), industrial 
(e.g. cotton for domestic mills) and urban food (e.g. maize - the mightiest 
cash crop of all in terms of volume and of households for whom it is the 
principal source of cash income).
As a result, land suitable (ecologically or locationally) for cash crop 
production rose in value relative to other land. Further larger land use 
right holdings came to be desirable - no longer did household consumption 
plus reserves for calamity plus limited local markets set a ceiling on 
economically meaningful land use rights. Further labour for cash crop 
production came to be available. With unequal holding sizes some 
households sold labour time (rather than, as previously, exchanging it on a 
relatively even basis with feasts making up the balance) to augment 
agricultural cash income. Further need or desire for goods purchasable (or 
taxes payable) only in cash spread beyond areas able to produce (or at 
least market) cash crops opening up migrant labour flows.
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A less explored effect was a greater male role in agriculture. Men 
occupied most expansion of cash crop (crops produced with primary intent to 
sell) opportunities. As cash cropping rose relative to household 
provisioning there clearly were changes in men's time use patterns and 
almost certainly increases in total male hours worked.
The tenure impact came via the increased value of cash crop suitable land 
and the greater economic value (and ability to amass labour to realise it) 
of large use right holdings. By and large it led to greater inequality of 
holding size and quality and greater manipulation of the allocation 
process.
Second, tree crops became more common. While some domestic food crops e.g. 
palm, coconut were tree most were field (grain, root crops) or short life 
bush/shrub (e.g. banana) crops. Most early export cash crops (coffee, 
cocoa, oil-palm, coconut, rubber) were tree crops. Tree crops totally 
altered the normal duration of use of specific pieces of land - often from 
a few years to a few generations.
Therefore, use tenure that had meant frequent moves and new allocations 
turned into something very like permanent tenure.
Third, in some contexts this tendency to permanent use (and therefore near 
permanence of secure, hereditable use tenure) was caused or augmented by 
growing land shortage. The traditional long rotation system has died in 
most of Africa not because anything ecologically sounder or clearly 
economically more rewarding is known (still less because agricultural 
experts decried the old system which they did until it was terminally ill) 
but because present household/land ratios render it impossible to maintain.
The onset of land shortage was sometimes exacerbated by colonial (or post 
colonial) state acquisition of land for a freehold sector (whether foreign 
or African) and/or for reserves of unused land. The latter frequently 
included (include) rotational land which to the bureaucratic eye looks like 
other second growth forest and may genuinely be perceived as unused if no 
local consultation is undertaken.
Land shortage ended the automatic right of community member households to 
adequate land use allocations (especially as adequate had a higher and a 
less precise level in the context of substantial cash sales than of
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predominantly household self provisioning plus local barter trade 
production). This made the allocation process more important, more costly 
(predictably user fees rose and bribes became common), less egalitarian and 
less able to ensure social harmony and community solidarity.
Fourth, external (to the land use allocation system community) forces 
intervened. While colonial states (and a fortiori settler states) were 
less likely to listen to community concerns and more likely to cream off 
much of the best land for freehold or reserves (normally with nil 
compensation even for households quite evidently dispossessed and forced to 
move) than post colonial African ones, the difference is frequently in 
degree, not kind. Actual allocation mechanisms have often either been 
changed to central or local government bodies which may not understand the 
process they are operating or put in limbo because in principle a codified 
system operates universally but in practice the traditional one continues 
in some form with greater or less benign neglect/acquiescence. In either 
case the security of traditional land use rights is sharply reduced and the 
possibilities for conflicts of right (one holding under the codified, one 
under the traditional system) and land grabbing (securing code title to 
traditionally allocated land and using either "due process" or undue 
influence to expel the sitting holders) greatly increased.
Further, the parallel leasehold and freehold systems do influence the 
evolution of traditional tenure. Larger landholders and, sometimes, 
allocaters see aspects of freehold/leasehold attractive to them and seek to 
have them grafted on to the traditional processes.
A final external influence impacting on land tenure processes is modern 
court systems and - more particularly - lawyers. While most evident in 
Anglophone West Africa where land litigation was the basis of the majority 
of members of the legal profession's cash flows (as conveyancing is in 
England), this factor is more general. Lawyers like work, modern code 
law/court oriented lawyers like to widen their scope (whether from a belief 
this widens certainty and order or a certainty it widens lawyers sources of 
income). In the context of increasing land values (and cash flows 
generated from them) and increasing land scarcity, clients have not been 
hard to find. The results of seeking to handle traditional, oral, 
customary law system cases in code law contexts, procedures and courts have 
been mixed. The uncertainty of results has increased because the courts
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call in outside principles/precedents to augment or to supplant local and 
often do not know the latter. The cost to claimants has risen - reducing 
the access of poorer ones. In fairness, the resulting evolution of 
traditional oral systems to modernised, written ones often tried in central 
legal system courts in Anglophone West Africa has not been a total disaster 
and has probably speeded up some useful aspects of evolution.
Some Consequential Changes
Inheritance has changed markedly. With near permanent use rights to 
specific pieces of land and increasing diversity in their value inheritance 
matters more absolutely and as to method. Increasingly parents (usually 
fathers as female landholding is still relatively uncommon) are unwilling 
to see farms they have built up go to distant relatives rather than their 
own children especially if their children's likely inheritance from other 
relatives on traditional principles is likely to be less. Also with 
extended families tending to contract, husbands are concerned that their 
widow's land use (and other support rights) are likely to be safer with her 
children than with other (often fairly distant) relatives. This has 
resulted in various methods to avoid traditional inheritance including 
transfers intra vivos and use of the code law system to make wills which 
usually (not always) are held by the central court system to override 
traditional inheritance customary law (viewed as a species of common law in 
cases of intestacy).
So has treatment of incomers. Basically there are now more candidates and 
less land. Further the creation of central governments makes physical 
exclusion of citizens from other communities harder (if by no means 
impossible if real tensions and a weak rural police presence co-exist as is 
not infrequently the case). The fairly uniform result is higher entry 
costs (usually to the allocating authority's benefit - or at least to that 
of its members). In areas in which land is not yet scarce and the incomers 
are not seen as a threat (a less uncommon situation than might be supposed) 
very large movements are possible. Otherwise tensions arise especially if 
a traditional authority or a 'modern' local government operating on joint 
local/communal interests is seeking to preserve a "land bank" to allow 
relatively adequate access to new land use rights to the next generation 
while the would be incomers are from land scarce areas and - for whatever 
reason - have the ear of the central government.
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The most significant (and also most uneven) changes probably relate to 
rights to transfer land use rights other than by inheritance. There is a 
trend toward household (in fact individual) ownership in the full sense and 
away from community ownership with secure use rights for community member 
households. Predictably changes tend to be fastest in respect to temporary 
transfers (rentals for a fixed term or until the holder retires from a non- 
agricultural occupation and returns to the land) and to transfers within an 
extended family. Changes have been intermediate in respect to permanent 
transfers within the community (often either still not accepted or 
requiring the consent of the allocating body). They are slowest in respect 
to outsiders (including financial institutions). Only in a few cases can 
an individual give a permanent land use title to a stranger incomer on his 
own authority and the stranger then expect to have unimpeded occupation and 
use. In most areas, for example, a debt seizure (even if legal) and sale 
would give the new 'owner' a very precarious position indeed with high 
probabilities of 'natural' combustion of his crops and buildings and 
unnaturally high 'straying' of his livestock and toolstock, if nothing 
worse.
A side aspect is division of use rights. For example a holder may retain 
the underlying use rights and exercise them as to tree crops while de facto 
renting out grazing or cropping and residence rights under or beside the 
trees.
Modernised Marginalisation Of Women
There is no inherent reason why changes in traditional land use rights 
systems should disadvantage women. In the actual SSA contexts the changes 
made usually have done so. This is reinforced by parallel changes in 
respect to household and kinship obligations and their interaction with 
inheritance.
Female headed households are now ubiquitous. They frequently comprise 20 
per cent to 25 per cent of all households (excluding households with an 
absent male member who fairly regularly remits and visits and plans to 
return at some stage in his life cycle). But neither the central states 
nor traditional/evolved traditional communities have fully endogenised or 
acted on this reality. Women can sometimes be granted land use rights (as 
can women s cooperatives) and can usually inherit land use rights by will. 
However, the former is not universally the case and even when practiced
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frequently discriminates against women in terms of certainty, size of 
allocation and/or quality - the latter two apparently based partly on the 
misperception (at least for female headed households) that women produce 
solely or primarily for the table not the market.
The price of escaping from "permanent minority" (but not entering into full 
equality) has usually been high. It is no longer true that an unmarried 
adult woman (especially if a single mother or a returnee from an urban 
sojourn), a widow or a divorced (or separated) women automatically has a 
male relative who will honour her claim to land use access and related 
subsistence/livelihood rights. The point is not the few cases in which 
there is no such relative living. These always existed and women in that 
position were usually in dire straits as indeed were aged or destitute 
males with no, or no accessible, relatives. Rather it is that the extended 
family is contracting and growing numbers of men decline to accept 
traditional obligations and find increasingly less social pressure on them 
to do so. While more advanced in urban areas this process is at work in 
most rural ones as well. The right to maturity and to freedom from 
wardship can all too easily also be the right to be destitute, landless and 
starving.
The same forces have made the 'traditional' inheritance system as now 
practiced in some areas (notably Zambia) iniquitous. Traditional heirs 
claim their rights, stripping away the assets of widows and their children 
and turning them off the land (sometimes despite contrary written wills). 
But nobody acknowledges the former balancing obligations to the bereaved 
women and children.
More directly related to farming, the greater male participation with the 
growth of cash cropping does not reduce women's workload. Quite the 
contrary - the same standard contributions of female task inputs into 
larger and/or more intense male crop cultivation increases their workload. 
Since it does not usually affect their provisioning (food, shelter, water, 
fuel) obligations and the day has not expanded work, overloads are endemic 
which is a problem even if the man does use his income in part on improved 
housing, better clothes for his wife and children and meeting children's 
school and health bills (which is not always the case).
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Women have not, been powerless in this context. The labour and 
income/provision budgets of most rural African households (perhaps 
especially in West Africa) were and are separate but interlocked with the 
exchanges bargained. Many women have been able to expand production they 
have the right to sell (and keep the proceeds) while others have - quite 
literally - charged wages for additional time devoted to their husbands' 
crops.
Female headed rural households have a different set of problems. They have 
unified time and income/expenditure budgets but ones with both built in 
labour shortages and specific task gaps. The latter centre on clearing, 
soil preparation (at least where ploughing - especially animal or machine 
powered ploughing - is common) and house construction. They are 
exacerbated by the reality that most female headed households in rural 
areas lack both start of crop year cash reserves or access to credit to buy 
in these services.
In general therefore the interaction of land tenure, agricultural practice, 
and social obligation changes over the past decades has marginalised more 
rural SSA women than it has empowered both within complete households and, 
perhaps especially, in the newly recognised female headed households.
To argue this is not to advocate a return to the past. Fairly evidently 
that is in large measure impracticable and many (probably most) SSA 
Africans including African women would not wish it. It is to warn that in 
objective terms rural modernisation has on balance marginalised women in 
SSA as has the emergence of the female headed household as a distinct 
social form.
IV.
Freehold/Long Leasehold — The Parallel System
Freehold tenure - in a variety of forms including long, transferable 
leaseholds - is significant in most African countries today. Therefore its 
forms, realities and impact on women's access to land use require at least 
brief attention whether or not one believes it will or ought to be the 
"wave of the future" "whose time has come" (and passed in the industrial 
economies busy crusading for it in SSA to judge both by the limitations on
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land use now burgeoning and by the parlous state of the bulk of most family 
farms in major industrial economies even after public support costs often 
egual to half and sometimes more than all family farm net agricultural 
income).
The largest single source of freehold and long leasehold land is the 
heritage of colonial land acquisition - land theft to put a more accurate 
term to most of it. Post colonial governments have rarely, if ever, 
returned such land to traditional system allocation. They have on occasion 
substituted secure leasehold user rights for freehold and charged (usually 
derisory) land rentals or taxes (e.g. Tanzania). But over time much 
freehold land has moved into African hands - it is no longer a white 
settler preserve. In a majority of cases (or at least hectares) the new 
holders are large, capitalist farmers acting on their own with weaker than 
average family links beyond their immediate households. Other cases 
involve quasi cooperative/quasi corporate farmer companies buying on behalf 
of small holder members and envisaging - but rarely achieving - a linked 
household, modern community regulated set of household tenure arrangements. 
A somewhat larger number (particularly in Kenya) involve state purchase of 
large freeholds and their sub-division for credit sale to smallholders - an 
approach with unequal results but fairly high average insecurity of tenure 
relating to repossession by the mortgage holding financial institutions.
The Kenyan small holder proprietors are an extension of a late colonial 
strategy .(especially but not only in Anglophone Eastern and Southern 
Africa) to create property owning African middle class, capitalist farmers 
partly to boost output but largely to create a base of households with "a 
stake in the system" to support "safe" African political inheritors as 
opposed to "radical" ones. While the strategy failed totally on its 
political front, African elites and governments have - notably in Zambia - 
continued it partly to provide opportunities for themselves and partly for 
the same political reasons as their predecessors.
A second fairly large source of real or apparent freehold tenure is land 
consolidation/tenure consolidation schemes. These have in some cases - 
e.g. Kenya - led to widespread freehold registration of consolidated plots 
in the names of individual (almost always male) owners within a code law 
framework on land transfers (including on inheritance and for debt). When
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initial registration campaigns have had heavy top level political support 
and administrative follow up at local level, initial and apparent results 
have been impressive.
Questions as to what these results mean arise because subsequent transfers 
(on rental, inheritance, sale) are frequently not registered (in about two 
thirds of all cases in Kenya) in the code system but apparently are handled 
by parallel quasi-traditional procedures often operated through local 
government functionaries and structures answerable to (and called to 
account in other areas by) central government. This does not appear, at 
least to date, to have led to a qualitative increase in land disputes or 
for a greater proportion using court as opposed to traditional settlement 
procedures. The most plausible interpretation is that these freehold 
systems have neither been generally internalised nor operational and are 
widely seen as less satisfactory than the evolving traditional ones.
A third source of freehold has been post colonial land grabbing. Its 
classic form arises when provision exists for "non-titled" land to be 
registered as freehold or for old rights to be reasserted as freehold 
(whatever they were before) without much reference to the intervening 
period or who has had quiet possession of de facto use rights for how long. 
The former, in the absence of recording of traditional rights, is a magna 
carta for political and economic barons to acquire peasant land (an element 
also notable in the original magna carta and its early descendants) and was 
seen at its most brutal and systemic apogee in Liberia. The other form 
became common in Somalia when river valley cultivation became profitable 
again after independence and especially in the 1980's. Somali elite 
members who during the colonial period had abandoned their holdings, and 
the Swahili serfs or slaves who had tilled them, reasserted their land 
rights taking back the land from the Swahili households who had often had 
up to fifty years undisturbed possession. The Swahili became sharecroppers 
or hired labourers or were simply expelled with no chance to obtain 
replacement land use rights.
Similar results have come from government policies intended to rationalise 
pastoral land use and harmonise large and small farmer interests. In 
Botswana these created a category of individual grazing lands (fenced) 
parallel to and excised from communal lands. The (unintended) result was
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that larger ranchers (the only ones who could afford fencing and boreholes) 
used their quasi-freehold rights to the hilt and then claimed communal 
rights of access in drought years.
Perhaps the most interesting freehold development is a creeping one not 
usually seen as such. Some traditional land tenure systems have evolved to 
an approximation of permanent, secure, freely transferable use rights which 
are in practice hard to distinguish substantively from leasehold. Ghana's 
coastal and forest zones and parts of southwestern Nigeria are the most 
evident cases but smaller examples exist in the Mount Kilimanjaro - Mount 
Meru zone in Tanzania. The remaining differences from classic forms of 
freehold seem to be non-acceptance of straightforward land seizure for debt 
and a real community ability to veto unacceptable purchasers (by communal 
pressures of varying degrees of statutory law alegality or illegality) 
which do constrain transfers.
The cases made for freehold have usually been increased security of land 
access, greater access to credit secured on land rights and consequential 
greater productivity. They have usually been advanced quasi theologically 
on the basis of universal principles with little examination of on the 
ground realities and a profound ignorance of actual African land tenure 
systems.
Security of use rights is very high in most SSA land tenure systems and if 
it is not abuses of the system (which as noted above are hardly absent from 
freehold systems), not its principles, are usually at fault. A more 
convincing case might be made in respect to lines of inheritance but 
broader use of wills, not freehold tenure (which would not by itself alter 
who inherited) seems a more plausible and accepted (by growing numbers of 
African farmers) way forward.
To argue that the ability to seize land for debt would increase credit 
availability may sometimes be true, albeit most African lenders are more 
concerned with medium farmer crops and current assets and cash flow and 
find small farmer loans unattractive for administration and collection cost 
reasons. But it is somewhat hard to see how creating a real risk of land 
loss via foreclosure would increase security of land use as understood by 
African farmers (or, one might suppose, any practitioner of single speak).
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Empirical studies (including a few multi country comparative ones) do not 
show land tenure systems to be a major determinant of productivity per 
person year of labour or per hectare. There is some evidence temporary 
land use right transferability (rental) is conducive to higher output, but 
that is a pattern increasingly consistent with most evolving traditional 
systems.
In short the case for general conversion to freehold tenure remains 
unproven in respect to likely gains. Its administrative costs and probable 
social costs/tensions from farmer opposition are, per contra, only too self 
evident.
Freehold Tenure In SSA And SSA Rural Women
In one respect the emergence of freehold tenure in SSA has had a negative 
impact on African rural households, including women, generally. Its 
creation - especially during the colonial period - reduced land, and 
especially the good land, available to African households. Admittedly it 
increased rural wage earning possibilities but - again especially during 
the colonial period - these were usually at levels unattractive as full 
time substitutes for household farm incomes and because of timing or 
location factors rarely usable in conjunction with continued family farming 
to achieve a higher overall household income. The larger holdings in the 
evolving traditional system more often provided a genuinely complementary 
wage earning opportunity e.g. in Ghana's forest zone and in northern 
Tanzania.
Beyond that generalisation a differentiation exists between wives of 
freeholders (female freeholders are relatively uncommon even in the West 
African evolutionary freehold variant and very uncommon elsewhere) and 
other rural women. The former have probably gained, albeit perhaps 
marginally and by developing broader ranges of income earning activities 
rather than within the household farming interlocked enterprise cluster 
proper. The latter have lost primarily from greater pressure on household 
land.
Freehold family farms are on average larger, more oriented to producing a 
few crops primarily for sale and more hired labour intensive than 
traditional system farms. The last characteristic probably reverses the 
increased labour time demands cash cropping increases would otherwise put
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on wives. But it also reduces the economic importance of the female 
household provisioning role in farm activity. Whether this reduces a 
woman's economic independence depends on whether she builds up a network of 
processing, trading and craft income generating activities, an option 
likely to be differentially more accessible to wives of freeholders than to 
their sisters in poorer households.
For wives (and female headed households) in the traditional sector the 
primary impact of expanding freeholds is greater land pressure which can 
only be offset by additional work-on the farm or for larger farmers as part 
time hired labour. Even if real incomes do not fall, or rise marginally, 
the increased workload is a negative consideration.
New Communal Tenure Systems In SSA?
New land tenure and production organisation on bases which were neither 
evolved traditional nor freehold had an intellectual vogue in the 1970's 
and were seriously promoted in some polities notably Tanzania, Mozambique 
and the last phase of the Ethiopian Empire (under Comrade Ras Mengistu 
Haile Mariam I). While not in fact all that similar (Tanzania's was 
intellectually traditional based; Mozambique's was in fact based on 
liberation war period production models; Ethiopia's was an odd mix of 
Russian state cooperative and traditional Imperial Ethiopian soldier and 
supporter strategic settlement themes) all three proved to be failures at 
least in respect to altering either land use or land tenure patterns 
significantly.
In Tanzania and Mozambique communal production of crops was never common.
At its peak it accounted for perhaps 3 per cent of cultivated land and 2 
per cent of output. Land allocation was rather more traditional in most 
cases than was realised (or intended by the state promoters) at the time. 
Except for a handful of cases, the basic unit was the household plot and 
the actual allocation process local. Inequality in household land use 
right sizes (and perhaps quality) was reduced but by no means eliminated. 
Communal production was less infrequent in Ethiopia but there the dominant 
feature was compulsory procurement at fixed (low) prices from villages - a 
feature unknown in the less communalist Tanzanian and Mozambican 
approaches.
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Certain aspects of the new systems had genuine support - especially in 
Tanzania. These included better access to public services, markets and 
production inputs - which turned on having clustered villages not isolated 
households rather than on land tenure. In addition some activities did 
achieve much broader indigenisation at village level than communal 
production. These included village cooperative commercial (crop sales, 
input purchases, general retail), storage and transport operations as well 
as (especially in Ethiopia) village organised silviculture (fuel-fodder- 
wood-food providing mini forests) and occasionally dairying. They also 
extended to community based public and infrastructural works. What is 
notable is that each has economies of scale and external benefits not 
necessarily present in communal crop (or a fortiori livestock) production.
A special (intended) characteristic of the Tanzania system was raising 
peasant household strength vis a vis state and party functionaries because 
villages automatically organised (or at least agglomerated) households in 
larger units. However, that result was also quite independent of land 
tenure or crop production elements.
The Mozambican and Ethiopian systems were on balance deeply unpopular and 
have vanished with few traces in the maelstrom of external aggression 
(directly and via local hired hands) in Mozambique and the interlocking 
revolutions which have broken up the Ethiopian (Amharic) Empire. The 
Tanzanian was, on balance, unevenly popular but its popular elements are 
now integrated into a radically changed rural settlement pattern (from 25 
to 30 per cent to 90 per cent village as opposed to scattered household and 
hamlet residence), revised and strengthened village level local government 
and restructured (and potentially now peasant household rather than 
professional manager or state accountable) primary cooperatives with no 
lasting impact on land tenure or use other than that resulting from the 
altered residence pattern.
To attempt to relate these experiences to women's access to land use rights 
is rather difficult (or potentially nugatory) because they had so little 
and so brief impact on land tenure and production management. However, in 
both Tanzania and Mozambique they were associated with women's special 
purpose production or marketing - input supply - service provision and 
lobbying cooperatives. These have survived to a degree in Tanzania and in 
the peri-urban Green Zones of Mozambique and do represent a modest
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improvement in some women's (by and large some poor women's) access to land 
use rights and to ability to organise (and benefit from the fruits of) 
production.
V.
What Might Usefully Be Done?
African land tenure/access to land use rights systems are changing and will 
continue to change. Their present form cannot be said to provide equal 
opportunity for (let alone equal results to) women. On balance the pattern 
of evolution has weakened the position of women. Therefore, a case exists 
for doing something to influence the process of change rather than simply 
standing and observing it. The question is what?
The following checklist or tentative agenda is deliberately general, 
imprecise and suggestive (or perhaps provocative). That is deliberate 
because to be a positive contribution it needs to contribute to a multi 
stage process dominantly in specific SSA contexts and primarily led by SSA 
rural women:
a. more country and area specific data collection and analysis involving 
primarily participatory research (finding out how rural women perceive 
existing conditions and patterns of change and what
interventions/opportunities/altered patterns of change they believe 
they need and want) backed by direct, field level observation 
(including) syntheses and analysis from field level observations);
b. analysis and dialogue from that data base, again specifically involving 
rural women but also persons influential in social, political and 
economic processes and decision taking (including but not limited to 
national women's organisation leaders and female professionals);
c. agreement on a prioretised, sequenced agenda (agendas) for action, 
including institutional and administrative aspects, as well as means to 
mobilise consciousness and support (especially by rural women) in 
support of the implementation of as much as possible of that agenda.
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History, Knowledge and Social Engineering
More data (and more understanding of it) on both the present and the past 
is needed. Most land tenure interventions in post-colonial SSA have been 
based on highly stylised (and often highly inaccurate) perceptions of both 
the existing situation and how and why it has evolved into the present.
The typical result has been social engineering interventions with limited 
support from intended beneficiaries, unanticipated opposition (frequently 
by supposed beneficiaries), quite unexpected side effects (more often 
negative than positive) and little ability to sustain or evolve the initial 
intervention. Not surprisingly the net impact (in fairness negative as 
well as positive) has usually been very low and the total failure rate (as
well as the number of missed opportunities) high.
One weakness has been a failure to relate land use access to other aspects
which both condition it and influence its results. These include
inheritance systems, the pattern of intra-household obligations and rights 
including labour and sources/expenditures budgets.
A second has been a failure to perceive that women are by no means 
powerless within traditional African rural households and that their power 
lies largely in the form of intra household labour, income and expenditure 
budget interactions. Better understanding of these could indicate likely 
opportunities for strengthening womens position e.g. winning wages for 
additional labour inputs into male income stream crops; securing more male 
construction/establishment inputs into water facilities and woodlots which 
would substantially reduce the workload associated with gender specific 
female activities (in the e.g.'s cited watering and fuelling).
Some Possible Tenure Reforms
Both men and women need security of land use rights. Most SSA evolving 
traditional tenure systems provide this rather better than most freehold 
systems. That does suggest an agenda bias toward influencing traditional 
tenure evolution not leaping toward a rush for freehold generalisation.
Small farmers - and especially women with farming activities within 
households as well as those who are heads of households - need better 
access to credit. Credit 'secured' on cash flow and moveable assets 
(especially growing crops) is both less likely to threaten security and
25
more accessible to women than credit secured on land rights. Credit 
'wholesaled' via primary cooperatives controlled by small farmer members 
can reduce transaction costs (which is vital to greater voluntary financial 
institution provision of credit to small farmers). It may also improve 
women's access if established women's cooperatives have more equal access 
than do individual women.
Who should be the holder of land use right titles is a complex issue. 
Clearly women should have an equal right to men to do so. Clearly too 
female headed households should have land rights registered in the woman's 
name, not that of some (often purely titular) male guardian or protector.
But substitution of individual for household titles would appear much more 
problematic. The typical African small farming household does have 
separable - in principle - male and female spheres but these interact. 
Treating them as separate holdings is not self evidently sensible and seems 
singularly unlikely to solve the problems arising from those male household 
heads who do not accept customary norms in respect to women's land use, 
labour income and control over income rights. Registering household title 
in the woman's name (in households including both spouses) has been 
suggested frequently and occasionally practiced but appears to seek to 
solve one imbalance by creating an equal and opposite one (as well as 
facing administrative sabotage and male farmer opposition which would 
threaten not only its own effectiveness but acceptance of other less 
controversial reforms as well.) The logic of the specialised partnership 
structure of most small African household farming enterprises would seem to 
suggest joint titling, an approach likely to generate broader support by 
rural women and both less uniform and less intense opposition by rural men 
(and by male agricultural and legal professionals).
Some Interacting Items
Tenure reforms need, for full effect, to be paralleled by action in other 
directions. A short list would include inheritance, status of female 
headed households, rural service prioretisation - structuring - delivery 
and - more speculatively in most contexts nationwide old age pensions.
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Traditional inheritance systems, especially with the collapse of their 
original parallel obligations to widows systems, are inequitable to 
(sometimes iniquitors in their treatment of) women. They also run counter 
to an increasing transgender desire to have ones own children inherit. For 
these reasons both female and male support for change is likely to be 
mobiliseable. The short term path of least resistance is furthering the 
trend toward written wills backed by unambiguous statutory provision for 
them to override customary practice. A second stage (which may be 
acceptable within a decade in some SSA states) would be statutory law 
entrenching the position of surviving spouses and children in the case of 
intestacy. (Intestacy in a traditional inheritance system was, in a sense, 
impossible. Both rights and obligations were defined, ubiquitous and not 
subject to individual alteration. In respect to obligations, however, 
almost all of these systems have disintegrated.)
The status of female headed households needs to be rendered identical to 
that of complete (or single adult male headed, in practice a minute 
category) households. This might be facilitated by statutory provisions 
(especially where the heritage of life long male guardianship for women 
lingers) but the more general problems relate to lack of operational 
realisation that these households are common and have serious inherent 
problems (notably low labour power to mouths to feed ratio) which are 
exacerbated by 'invisibility' and discrimination. That would appear to 
call for consciousness raising by women, women's organisations and national 
leaders.
Rural service prioretisation needs to include reducing women's workload and 
increasing their hourly productivity. Often access to nearby pure water, 
development of small scale agroforestry and provision of universal access 
to preventative and curative primary health care are the most proven and 
practicable immediate actions. Watering, wooding and tending sick 
household members are gender specific and very time consuming duties.
In addition services must both cease to treat women as invisible (literally 
in the case of extension officers who believe they talk primarily with male 
household heads only, when in fact both spouses are usually present) and to 
relate to actual gender divisions of labour. For example if water project 
construction is primarily male but operation and maintenance female, then 
management committees should be set up with female majorities and
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maintenance training provided primarily to women. Further women should not 
be limited in their roles within services - e.g. to cooking and garden 
plots within agricultural extension. This is not to argue against 
directing female obligation oriented extension (e.g. nutrition) primarily 
to women. It is to argue that nutrition extension should be based within 
agricultural extension and related to production extension to make its 
advice realistic and implementable.
Old age pensions reduce vulnerability and dependence of aged persons (and 
as a by-product pressure to have very large families to ensure that one or 
two children survive long enough and are fortunate enough in economic terms 
to sustain their aged parents). Because in SSA (as elsewhere) a 
substantial majority of persons over 60 are women OAP's would 
differentially benefit women.
Admittedly universal OAP's are not practicable in the short run in a 
majority of SSA countries for financial and/or administrative capacity 
reasons. But one SSA state (Namibia) already has (and is improving) such a 
system. Three more (Botswana, Mauritius, Seychelles) could introduce them 
more or less immediately. Others - e.g. Zimbabwe - have the administrative 
capacity and could achieve the fiscal within a decade. The opportunities 
now and in 2002 at the least deserve more and more serious exploration and 
dialogue.
Some Legal System Approaches To Land Tenure
Codified land tenure systems that do not address traditional tenure (or 
list it as outside their scope for an ever extending "interim" period as in 
Tanzania) are not optimal, even if better than ones which set up new system 
of general application on paper but not in practice (e.g. - in different 
ways - Kenya and Mozambique). Study of actual traditional practice and 
desired directions of evolution should allow enacting statutory frameworks 
within which evolving traditional systems had to operate. These could 
usefully include equal access rights for women and organised groups of 
women (e.g. female cooperatives).
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Whether code frameworks to enforce intra household obligations would be 
useful is less clear. Their prime functions would be consciousness raising 
and community social pressure legitimising, because the court systems of 
SSA could hardly handle large numbers of cases.
Specific provision needs to be made for local/regional customary practices 
to continue until they evolve into a relatively uniform system nationally. 
To work well, the administration of these systems needs to be local both in 
the sense of being within local government and being personed largely by 
individuals with genuine local knowledge.
In some cases it is a matter of some urgency to codify who does have the 
power to administer customary land allocation and adjudicate on or 
conciliate land tenure disputes because the bodies doing so have no 
apparent governmental authority to do so. If they are generally accepted 
civil society bodies this may create few immediate problems but it always 
leaves open the chance of conflict with local level central officials who - 
on paper - do have such authority and/or challenges by aggrieved 
individuals in courts who will be forced to rule present practice (whatever 
the merits of its decisions) is either alegal and non-binding or positively 
illegal.
Evolving traditional law cannot, and local level bodies aiming at 
accessibility, flexibility, speed and intelligibility to rural households 
should not, attempt codification and case precedent collection fully 
comparable to statute law. On the other hand, there is no necessity to go 
to the opposite extreme as is often done. Oral tradition and experienced 
elders as talking law libraries are valuable and deserve more respect than 
they usually receive from fellow legal professionals and other branches of 
the legal system. But it is by no means self evident that setting down 
principles in writing as well as summaries of seminal cases need undermine 
rather than complement their roles. Nor is it evident that para-legal 
training for allocating body members and - perhaps - the right of claimants 
to have para-legal representation before such bodies is inherently non- 
feasible nor generally undesirable.
- Reginald Herbold Green 
Maputo, Mozambique 
February 1992
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